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THE PROCEDURALLY DIRECTIVE APPROACH TO
TEACHING CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
Maughn Rollins Gregory
Department of Educational Foundations
Montclair State University

Abstract. Recent articles on teaching controversial topics in schools have employed Michael Hand’s
distinction between “directive teaching,” in which teachers attempt to persuade students of correct positions on topics that are not rationally controversial, and “nondirective teaching,” in which teachers avoid
persuading students on topics that are rationally controversial. However, the four methods of directive
teaching discussed in the literature — explicit directive teaching, “steering,” “soft-directive teaching,”
and “school ethos endorsement” — make rational persuasion problematic, if not self-defeating. In this
essay, Maughn Rollins Gregory argues that “procedurally directive teaching” offers an alternative to
such approaches because it derives from the intention to guide inquiry rather than to persuade. He
demonstrates that the conceptual frameworks of perfectionism and antiperfectionism, which have been
proposed for directive teaching on same-sex marriage, can instead be used to generate open questions for
student inquiry, as can a third, civil rights framework. Given these considerations, Gregory maintains
that pedagogical guidance on this topic should be procedurally directive rather than substantively directive. Further, the fact that legal, political, and ethics scholars disagree about which framework is more
appropriate to the issue of same-sex marriage indicates that such arguments cannot be dispositive of the
pedagogical issue of how to frame classroom discussions about it. Rather, students should inquire into
this meta-level framing dispute for themselves.

Introduction
In recent years a number of articles and Afterwords contributions published in
Educational Theory have addressed the questions of what kinds of topics should be
taught as controversial in schools and how best to approach teaching those topics.
This exchange has employed two distinctions offered by Michael Hand.1 The first
is between topics that are controversial in the “epistemic” sense that they cannot
be resolved by available arguments and evidence, and those that are controversial
only in the “behavioral” sense that there is actual disagreement about them,
including among some who hold unreasonable views.2 The second distinction
is between directive and nondirective teaching: “To teach a claim directively is
to teach it with the intention of persuading students of its truth or falsity; to
teach a claim nondirectively is to teach it with the intention of not so persuading
them.”3
For Hand, the pedagogical choices presented by these distinctions should be
made on the basis of what he calls the epistemic criterion: “directive teaching is
1. Michael Hand, “What Should We Teach as Controversial? A Defense of the Epistemic Criterion,”
Educational Theory 58, no. 2 (2008): 213–228.
2. Hand refers to the “behavioral” criterion for identifying controversial topics offered by Robert Dearden
in “Controversial Issues and the Curriculum” (1981), in Theory and Practice in Education (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 86.
3. Michael Hand, response to Bryan Warnick and D. Spencer Smith in “Afterwords,” Educational Theory
64, no. 4 (2014): 425.
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appropriate when a claim is established or refuted by the available evidence and
argument; nondirective teaching is appropriate when a claim is not so established
or refuted.”4 In other words, teachers should attempt to persuade students to accept
the correct positions on topics that are not rationally controversial — even in the
face of significant social opposition — and they should not to attempt to persuade
students one way or another on topics that are rationally controversial — even if
the teacher, personally, holds one of the opposing views.
Hand insists that the distinction between directive and nondirective teaching
is one of intention rather than method, and that the intention derived from the
epistemic criterion is not simply that students accept positions that are true or
reasonable, but that they do so because those positions are true or reasonable
— in Hand’s words, “securing students’ rational assent.”5 This follows from his
conviction “that the central aim of education is to equip students with a capacity
for, and inclination to, rational thought and action.”6 However, the methods of
directive teaching that he and others have discussed make acting on that intention
a complicated — in some cases, even a self-defeating — venture.
Hand’s use of the term “persuasion” in this context is telling. On the one
hand, he clearly has in mind the kind of “rational persuasion” described by Emily
Robertson.7 On the other hand, the methods of directive teaching he and others
have recommended present important obstacles to achieving that goal. I believe
the exchange thus far has conflated distinctions made by Douglas Walton among
normative dialogue types that are important to consider, not only in determining
when and how to teach topics as controversial but in understanding and evaluating
classroom discourse more broadly. In the following section of this essay I will
relate Walton’s theory of dialogue to the issue of teaching controversial topics
and argue that the appropriate pedagogical intention in that context is to guide
inquiry rather than to persuade. I will then assess four kinds of directive teaching
discussed in recent articles and argue in favor of another kind that I call “procedurally directive teaching.” In the final section I will apply the notion of procedurally
directive teaching to the case on which much of the recent attention on teaching
controversial topics has focused: leading classroom discussions about same-sex
marriage.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 426.
6. Hand, “What Should We Teach as Controversial?,” 218.
7. Emily Robertson, “The Value of Reason: Why Not a Sardine Can Opener?” in Philosophy of Education
1999, ed. Randall Curren (Urbana, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 1999), 1–14.
MAUGHN ROLLINS GREGORY is Professor in the Department of Educational Foundations and
the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children (IAPC) at Montclair State University,
University Hall 2197, Montclair, NJ, 07043; e-mail <gregorym@mail.montclair.edu. >. His primary areas
of scholarship include philosophy of education, pragmatism, philosophy for children, and gender and
education.
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Varieties of Classroom Discourse
In reflecting on my own teaching and in working with school teachers on
facilitating meaningful classroom dialogue, I have found it helpful to analyze the
discourse in which we engage our students and colleagues, using Douglas Walton’s
taxonomy of normative dialogue types.8 Walton identifies six types, each with a
distinct purpose and structure: information-seeking aims to distribute knowledge;
persuasion aims to resolve conflicts of belief; negotiation aims to resolve conflicts
of interest; inquiry aims to establish the truth or most reasonable position about
an issue; deliberation aims to determine how to achieve a shared goal; and eristic
dialogue aims to air grievances. Walton describes his taxonomy as pragmatic
because each dialogue type is distinguished by a unique goal, and he describes
each type as normative because it obliges participants to follow a distinct set of
procedures conducive to reaching that goal. Other thinkers have offered different
taxonomies,9 and this variety of types of discourse raises the pedagogical issue
of which types are best suited for particular classroom situations. When is it
appropriate to negotiate classroom activities with students? How often does the
curriculum call for genuine deliberation? How much student talk is a response
to teachers’ assessment questions? Should classroom discussions be organized as
exchanges of information, as competitive debates, or as collaborative inquiries?
The answers, of course, depend on our pedagogical purposes, as I will illustrate by
considering purposes relevant to three of Walton’s dialogue types that seem most
relevant to teaching controversial topics: negotiation, persuasion, and inquiry.10
The goal of negotiation dialogue is to resolve a conflict of interest in a
manner acceptable to all interested parties. To construct student engagement
with a controversial topic as a discourse of negotiation is, strictly speaking, a
category mistake unless the controversy involves conflict among the interests
of the students themselves that arises in the setting of the classroom or school.
Otherwise, the negotiation must be hypothetical, as in a classroom discussion
of a controversial topic like same-sex marriage, structured as a mock political
negotiation in which teachers and/or students try to work out a policy that
accommodates their diverse views.11 Understanding the uses of negotiation and
developing negotiation skills are valuable educational aims, both in preparing
8. Douglas Walton, The New Dialectic: Conversational Contexts of Argument (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1998).
9. See, for example, Nicholas C. Burbules, Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice (New York:
Teachers College Press, 1993); and Robertson, “The Value of Reason.”
10. I will not consider the other of Walton’s types: deliberation, because it presupposes a shared goal;
eristic, because it is personal rather than substantive; and information-seeking, because it is typically a
component of the three types of dialogue I consider.
11. Hand also argues against a “practical accommodation frame” for classroom discussions of same-sex
marriage, in which the students’ task is to work out a policy that accommodates as many of their diverse
views (moral, political, and religious, among others) as possible. I am distinguishing the consideration
of which type of dialogue to use in organizing the discussion (negotiation, inquiry, and so on) from the
consideration of how to frame the question to be discussed, in terms of relevant considerations. For
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students for their future participation in democratic society and as a mechanism
for their immediate participation in the political and ethical conundrums of the
classroom and the school.12 Nevertheless, two considerations weigh against using
the procedures of negotiation discourse to engage with controversial topics that do
not involve school-based conflicts of interest. One is epistemic: as Hand points out,
people hold all kinds of unreasonable views, for example, about same-sex marriage,
that cannot be challenged as such in a negotiation dialogue but that must be given
equal weight to reasonable views.13 He argues that negotiation is not appropriate
in any context in which “some participants … hold false views for bad reasons”
(FCD, 509). This is going too far, as in the world outside the classroom there are
often good reasons to make political deals that accommodate unreasonable views
— for example, because there is no nonviolent alternative. But Hand is correct that
teaching students to reason well is an important purpose of education, and this
obliges teachers not to let unreasonable views go unchallenged in a classroom.14
This is particularly important when those unreasonable views are beset with
strong emotions, obdurate ideological convictions, or a history of violence. The
second consideration is that some students’ views about controversial topics are
prejudiced in morally offensive ways. Therefore, because teaching students to treat
with equal dignity people whose ethnicity, religion, socioeconomic position, or
gender identity or practices differs from theirs is also an important purpose of
education, teachers are obliged not to let prejudicial sentiments go unchallenged
in a classroom — again, notwithstanding the fact that such sentiments are often
accommodated in political negotiation elsewhere.15 For these reasons, in the
context of teaching controversial topics, the teacher’s intention should be neither
to negotiate a position that both teacher and students can agree on, nor to facilitate
such a negotiation among the students themselves.
Hand’s account, see Michael Hand, “Framing Classroom Discussion of Same-Sex Marriage,” Educational
Theory 63, no. 5 (2013): 497–510. This work will be cited in the text as FCD for all subsequent references.
12. I have argued elsewhere that episodes of negotiation can also be important stages of inquiry dialogue.
See Maughn Rollins Gregory, “Normative Dialogue Types in Philosophy for Children,” Gifted Education
International 22, no. 2–3 (2006): 160–171.
13. Walton makes this point in a more qualified way: “In … the inquiry, the goal of a participant is
generally to prove that some proposition is true or false, or at least to argue that it is true or false by giving
evidence to support it. In negotiation dialogue, however, matters of the truth and falsity of propositions
are secondary. They are relevant to some extent, and in certain situations they can be important, but the
main goal in putting forward an argument is to try to get a good deal” (The New Dialectic, 100).
14. On this point, see “What Should We Teach as Controversial?,” in which Hand acknowledges that
even this obligation is not absolute, as, for instance, when a school may legitimately decide to soft-pedal
its teaching of evolution in a religious community that might otherwise withdraw students from that
school (228).
15. On this point, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010). I distinguish this kind of respect from the
solidarity of conscience and private purposes that it is not the business of schools to cultivate in Maughn
Rollins Gregory, “Care as a Goal of Democratic Education,” Journal of Moral Education 29, no. 4 (2000):
445–461.
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The same considerations also weigh against what Walton calls persuasion
dialogue as a normative type of classroom discourse on controversial topics, either
among students or between students and teachers. The most common genre of persuasion is the debate, which compels participants to challenge each other’s views
but not in the attempt to discover which position is most reasonable. The goal,
rather, is to persuade one’s opponent, or the audience of the persuasive contest,
to accept a particular position. As Walton explains, the epistemic standard of this
type of dialogue depends on the quality of the reasons one’s opponent is willing to
accept: one needn’t offer strong reasons to an opponent who can be persuaded by
weaker reasons, any more than a seller in a market need offer a lower price than
the buyer is willing to pay.16 Also, though one might become obligated to concede
certain points in a debate, the goal is to concede as little as possible, so that one
never incurs what Robertson calls “the obligation to lose.”17 Therefore, a teacher
who assumes the stance of persuasion vis-à-vis his or her students, if also intending
to teach for reasonableness, must be on guard against persuading the students too
easily and against resisting legitimate student challenges to his or her position.
These concerns are more difficult to deal with in the context of a persuasion dialogue among students that is only monitored by the teacher. Students
attempting to persuade each other of their own favored positions may present
unreasonable views, fallacious reasoning, and even morally offensive sentiments
that go unchallenged by, and can actually work to persuade, their peers. A teacher
who intervenes to shore up epistemic standards changes the dialogue from a
persuasive contest to something like an inquiry. But otherwise, there is no way to
ensure that the most reasonable position, as judged by epistemic standards, will
prevail.
Of course, the participants of most political debates are not actually attempting to persuade their opponents but an audience of citizens who may be expected
to be less informed about the issues and easier to persuade with weak and even
fallacious reasons. This explains the profusion in political debate of hyperbole, ad
hominem attack, and other rhetorical devices inimical to careful reasoning. Two
other genres of persuasion dialogue avoid these problems. One is the panel debate
among experts in a discipline, which serves the purpose of informing an audience
of peers about conflicting, reasonable positions on controversies in the discipline.
The other is the courtroom trial in which adversarial parties present argumentative cases and challenge each other’s cases in the attempt to persuade a judge or
jury. What makes these persuasion dialogues different from political debates is,
first, that their audiences can be expected to have high epistemic standards, either
because they are credentialed within a discipline or, in the case of the jury, because
they will conduct their own, disinterested inquiry into the case, with the goal of
16. The strength of this analogy derives from Walton’s insight that persuasion and negotiation dialogues
are both means of resolving conflicts — of opinion and interest, respectively — so the actual satisfaction
of the participants, apart from any objective assessment of the result, is the only criterion of success.
17. Robertson, “The Value of Reason,” 3.
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reaching a shared agreement on the most reasonable position. Second, this difference in audience means that contenders in these persuasion dialogues will not be
served by rhetorical devices, at least to the same extent. And third, in both of these
contexts the dialogue is moderated by an authority — a judge or a disciplinary peer
— who is on guard against the introduction of irrelevant evidence and misleading
arguments. These three factors blur the distinction between persuasion dialogue
and inquiry because together they construct a distinction between, on the one
hand, the interlocutors whose role is to persuade and to avoid having to concede
points, and, on the other, the audience they wish to persuade, who are not participants in that dialogue and whose role is to inquire independently toward the most
reasonable position. Thus, a debate or a panel discussion could be an appropriate
forum for a classroom discussion of a controversial topic, but only as a preliminary
exercise to a broader inquiry facilitated for careful and collaborative thinking.
The goal of inquiry dialogue is to establish the truth or the most reasonable
belief about a matter, or to establish that there is insufficient evidence to do so.
The process involves careful reasoning, the consideration of diverse views, and
making one’s thinking accountable to the critique of one’s peers. The epistemic
standard of inquiry is the highest possible: positions are only accepted if they
are supported by the strongest arguments and evidence available, and participants
are committed to changing their own views in favor of the position that emerges
as the most reasonable. These features make inquiry the most effective type of
classroom discourse for teaching for reasonableness and for teaching controversial
topics that can be expected to evoke unreasonable views and offensive sentiments
the teacher is obligated to challenge. It is also the form of discourse most aligned to
the aim of teaching disciplinary knowledge. An important aspect of that aim is that
students come to understand science, history, political theory, ethics, and the other
disciplines as fields of inquiry with certain methods of investigation and standards
of evidence, and that they learn to reason within the disciplines. That is, we want
students not only to acquire certain bodies of knowledge but also to understand
how that knowledge is warranted by disciplinary methods. Likewise, we want
them to understand not only what political and ethical mores their community
practices, but the principles that underlie those mores and how these have been
justified and modified through processes of political, legal, and moral reasoning.
The teacher conducting classroom inquiry may expect or even intend that
students will find a particular position to be the most reasonable, but his or her
commitment to the procedures of inquiry are more fundamental than any such
intention, and so this teacher demonstrates willingness to follow the inquiry where
it leads, even to unexpected results. Indeed, inquiry is an appropriate practice in
the absence of a favored position or any expectation or intention on the part of
the teacher regarding its outcome. This means that the commitment to engage
students in rigorous disciplinary inquiry obviates Hand’s normative distinction
based on the epistemic criterion: that teachers should intend to persuade students
to accept claims that are epistemically settled and refrain from intending to
persuade them to accept claims that are epistemically controversial. Even though
by “persuade,” Hand means “to secure rational assent,” the difference between
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persuasion and inquiry as intentional pedagogical stances is more than semantic.
This becomes obvious when we examine practices associated with directive
teaching.

Directive Teaching Methods
Bryan Warnick and D. Spencer Smith identify two components constitutive
of directive teaching methods: first, the endorsement of a favored position and,
second, encouragement and guidance for students to accept that position. They
further explain that either component may be explicit or implicit.18 These distinctions provide a heuristic of four categories of directive teaching methods that
illuminates the tension between the pedagogical stances of persuasion and inquiry.
Examples of directive teaching that are explicit in both endorsement and encouragement are behaviorist programs such as D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) that employ stimulus-response conditioning (slogans, award competitions,
motivational speeches, student pledges, graphic films, and so on) to motivate right
behavior. An example of explicit directive teaching that gives more attention to
reasoning is a class discussion on a topic in which the teacher participates as the
proponent of the correct view: explaining it with reasons, defending it against criticisms raised by students, criticizing alternative positions they offer, and perhaps
assessing their understanding or acceptance of it. While this method appeals to
student thinking and helps them understand the favored position in terms of disciplinary methods of inquiry, it risks winning student agreement by means of the
teacher’s social and epistemic authority.
For a teacher to secure a student’s rational assent to some proposition — a
position on a controversial topic or a conclusion of disciplinary inquiry — requires
both that the teacher appeal only to good reasons and that the student accept
the proposition on the basis of those reasons. However, the ineradicable power
that teachers exercise over students makes both of these conditions problematic.
As Warnick and Smith argue (reminiscent of John Locke), a teacher’s “social
authority” (for instance, the authority to assign grades) is necessarily coercive and
so its exercise in the context of teaching a controversial topic is incompatible with
winning students’ rational assent (COC, 236). This is so even when the exercise of
social authority is implicit or unconscious. Of course, the use of social authority
may also backfire, leading students with views that conflict with those promoted
by the teacher — for example, on the topic of same-sex marriage — to become
entrenched in their position, out of resentment for the school’s pitting its authority
against that of their family or religious community. In contrast, Warnick and Smith
argue that if the teacher is a legitimate authority on a topic, his or her endorsement
of a particular position is one “epistemologically sound” reason for students to
accept it (COC, 237). However, if it becomes the only or the primary reason,
students have effectively substituted the teacher’s judgment for their own.
18. Bryan R. Warnick and D. Spencer Smith, “The Controversy Over Controversies: A Plea for Flexibility
and for ‘Soft-Directive’ Teaching,” Educational Theory 64, no. 3 (2014): 227–244. This work will be cited
in the text as COC for all subsequent references.
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A second category of directive teaching methods consists of those in which the
teacher’s guidance toward the favored position is explicit but his or her endorsement of that position is implicit, even covert. An example is the method Hand
recommends of “steering” a classroom discussion by “guiding participants, by
means of strategic prompts, questions, and interjections, toward a predetermined
conclusion” (FCD, 499). The dialogue is structured ostensibly as an open inquiry
but is facilitated by a teacher who, unbeknownst to the students, is actively
promoting a particular position. In reality it is a persuasion dialogue posing as an
inquiry. The advantage of this method is that it reduces the risk that students will
be swayed by the teacher’s social authority, since the teacher does not explicitly
endorse a particular position. At the same time, it increases the risk that they will
be improperly swayed by the teacher’s epistemic authority in two ways. First, as
with direct persuasion dialogue, if students are not able to follow the teacher’s
lead in seeing for themselves that the favored position is more reasonable, they
may nevertheless see that it is being promoted and that alternative positions are
being undermined in line with the teacher’s interventions; as a result, they may
defer to his or her epistemic authority. Second, the intent to persuade may incline
the teacher to use the weakest reasons that do the job of persuading the students.
Though presumably not what Hand intended, this possibility arises with the intentional stance of persuasion — particularly if the teacher is more concerned that
students be persuaded than that they think for themselves. She may, for instance,
only induce criticism of challenges to the favored position and of alternative positions that students actually raise, and not of stronger arguments of which they are
unaware. With both of these risks, concealment of the teacher’s intent to persuade
puts students at an epistemic disadvantage. Further, this concealment is dishonest
— a criticism Hand dismisses inadequately as “unwarranted purism” (FCD, 500).19
The third category of directive teaching is what Warnick and Smith call
“soft-directive teaching,” which they describe as follows:
With “soft-directive” teaching the [teacher’s] endorsement [of a position] is made explicit,
while the encouragement and guidance toward the position are more implicit. More important,
the endorsement is surrounded by markers allowing for disagreement and encouraging critical
analysis. The teacher might say something like “Here is what we believe is the most reasonable
position and here are the reasons behind this position, but you should also think carefully about
why we might be wrong.” Soft-directive teaching combines a tone of fallibilism and openness
to being challenged with an explicitly endorsed position. (COC, 240)

The soft-directive teacher overtly endorses a position but “does not explicitly
encourage students to accept [it]”; instead, this teacher “gently guide[s] students
to that position by walking them through … his or her [own] reasoning” (COC,
19. Hand is replying to the assertion by David Bridges that “to ask a question as if it were a genuine enquiry when it is not, or to engage people in what purports to be a genuine enquiry, while
actually manipulating the whole process to your own ends is to be at best covert and at worst
downright dishonest. It is difficult to see how to defend such practice when there are perfectly practicable alternative patterns of behavior open to one.” See David Bridges, Education, Democracy, and
Discussion (Slough, UK: National Foundation for Educational Research, 1979), 114, cited in FCD,
499.
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241). This method qualifies as an exercise of persuasion, as “the goal of the teacher
remains for students to adopt the most reasonable position” (COC, 241). It serves
the aims of teaching for reasonableness in that by “thinking through arguments
all the way to conclusions, the teacher has a chance to exemplify the ‘epistemic
virtues,’ such as openness, fairness, respect for evidence, and so forth … , showing
how one could come to decisions in the face of highly complex, fraught, and
murky issues” (COC, 238). It can also serve the aim of teaching for disciplinary
knowledge by demonstrating how the favored position is derived from disciplinary
methods of inquiry. In both of these ways it can secure student’s rational assent,
provided students are able to follow the teacher’s reasoning process and provided
they can agree with his or her premises.
Another advantage of this method, according to Warnick and Smith, is that
“worries about coercion in directive teaching are lessened” because the teacher
models fallibilism, invites students to think about the topic for themselves, and
withholds external correction of that thinking (COC, 241). Indeed, it is unclear
what kind of classroom discussion is compatible with soft-directive teaching or
how the teacher practicing this method should respond to student challenges of
the favored position — other than not by giving “evaluative feedback based on
congruence with a predetermined answer” (COC, 241). In soft-directive teaching,
“beyond identification of a position as most reasonable, the teacher trusts in the
power of the evidence and arguments” he or she presents to do the persuading
(COC, 241). This seems to indicate that the soft-directive teacher should not
provide direct feedback on the quality of student’s reasoning (for example, “I see
how you came to that generalization, but can we think of any counterexamples?”),
but should only reiterate the official position (for example, “Here is why we think
the reason you just gave is weak, but you should think about why we might be
wrong about that”). If this interpretation is correct it means that one disadvantage
of soft-directive teaching is that students are not guided to reflect on the strength
of their own, or each other’s, reasoning.
Finally, Warnick and Smith also describe a method of directive teaching in
which both the endorsement of the favored position and the guidance for students
to accept that position are left implicit:
[A] pedagogy could give students access to all available arguments and evidence and tell them
to construct their own answer, all within a school context that endorses a view through its
ethos — that is, through its explicit and implicit policies and practices. A school might ask
students to construct their own opinion about racial diversity, for example, while the school
rules, policies, and demographics reveal a clear endorsement of diversity. Through this “school
ethos endorsement,” a teacher or school can endorse a position while still maintaining a
student-centered approach. (COC, 235)

The authors are correct that school policies and practices perform a pedagogical
function. For instance, students invited to study a range of arguments about
same-sex marriage and invited to formulate their own position would surely be
influenced by the ways in which lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
(LGBTQ) students, parents, teachers, administrators, and staff are treated in the
school, how LGBTQ perspectives are or are not included across the curriculum,
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and how current events relating to LGBTQ people are or are not discussed. As
Warnick and Smith suggest, this form of persuasion is the least coercive (the most
student-centered). They do not mention classroom discussion in conjunction with
this method, though presumably an open-ended discussion in which students
compared, critiqued, and built on each other’s positions would be compatible
with it, if the teacher did not intervene to support the position that coincided
with the school ethos. However, providing students with “all available arguments
and evidence” on a topic serves the aims of teaching for reasonableness and for
disciplinary knowledge only if students are able to tell faulty reasoning from
sound and to evaluate empirical claims and credentials of expertise. If they are
not, then presenting them with conflicting positions and arguments can be confusing and might even lead them to distrust reason and disciplinary methods of
inquiry as meaningful ways of deciding what to believe. As Hand has argued, this
is particularly so if “all available arguments and evidence” is meant to include
those in support of unreasonable positions.20

Procedurally Directive Teaching
Our brief look at the kinds of methods that might be used for directive
teaching — and the more thorough analysis provided by Warnick and Smith —
indicates that Hand’s distinction between “the intention of persuading students
that some claim is true or false, and … the intention of avoiding such persuasion”
offers limited pedagogical guidance.21 On the one hand, the intent to persuade
involves necessary choices among actions of guiding, explaining, encouraging,
and correcting, some of which are incompatible with winning students’ rational
assent. On the other hand, the imperative to avoid persuasion precludes some of
these methods without offering guidance about how or why to teach topics that
are genuinely epistemically controversial.
Teaching that assumes the intentional pedagogical stance of inquiry is neither
directive in the manner of methods of persuasion, nor nondirective in the sense of
a practice of nonmethod. Rather, in keeping with the terms used both by Hand and
by Warnick and Smith, it is “procedurally directive.” There are several well-known
methods that fit this category,22 and they all have in common that teachers provide students access to a wide range of available arguments and evidence, elicit
additional arguments and evidence from the students’ own experience, and invite
20. In “What Should We Teach as Controversial?,” for example, Hand asserts that “The behavioral
criterion requires teachers to refrain from endorsing a view on any issue about which there is controversy,
even when only one view is epistemically justifiable. This cannot do other than convey to students the
message that epistemic considerations are not decisive. The plain implication of teacher neutrality on
all matters on which people are observed to disagree is that consensus, rather than evidence or argument,
is the proper warrant for belief” (218).
21. Hand, “Afterwords,” 425.
22. Two of these are interpretive discussion, described in Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon’s Learning to
Teach Through Discussion: The Art of Turning the Soul (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 2009); and Philosophy for Children, described in Matthew Lipman et al., Philosophy in the
Classroom (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).
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them to formulate their own positions through a process of collaborative inquiry
that is methodologically rigorous but substantively open-ended. In this method
teachers employ a kind of epistemic authority different from special expertise
on a topic: that of regulating the procedures of disciplinary inquiry and reasoned
dialogue in order to, for example, help students make sound inferences, avoid
fallacies, weigh evidence, ask critical questions, look for missing points of view,
consider practical consequences, generate creative hypotheses, and think of ways
to test them. In procedurally directive teaching there is neither overt endorsement
of a favored position (other than what might be implied by the classroom and
school ethos) nor guidance for the students to accept one, though the teacher
may anticipate which position the students are likely to find most reasonable. In
addition, the characteristics of this approach are the same whether the topic being
studied is epistemically or behaviorally controversial, or neither.
With regard to the aims of teaching for reasonableness and for knowledge
warranted by disciplinary methods, this method is stronger than the methods
of directive teaching just considered. It involves the kind of “strategic prompts,
questions, and interjections” used in steering, but in this case they are employed
equally against weak reasoning and in favor of strong reasoning expressed in
support of any position. Also, these interventions are made by the teacher not
only in order to improve the quality of the inquiry as it unfolds, but also to show
students how to make these kinds of interventions with each other in a cooperative effort to discover the most reasonable position. The discipline exercised in
procedurally directive teaching is neither a form of social coercion that would
intimidate students and thus keep them from voicing certain positions based on
their content, nor the kind of epistemic expertise that risks supplanting students’
own judgments. On the contrary, this method provides positive support that gives
students practice in asking critical questions about and thinking carefully through
the information and ideas presented to them, even by people in authority over
them. It prepares students to think for themselves about controversial topics, but
also to collaborate with others in the search for reasonable belief.
To say that procedurally directed discussions should be open-ended does not
mean that teachers should present topics such as evolution, climate change, and
same-sex marriage as contestable among disciplinary experts or legal authorities —
though there is no reason for teachers not to acknowledge disputes among experts
and between official positions and lay opinion.23 It also does not mean that teachers should disguise or downplay the school’s position on the topic, if there is one,
or that teachers should treat all opinions on the topic as equally supportable. It
only means that students are free to disagree with the favored position, which
only means that they will not be penalized for doing so. I have argued elsewhere
that teachers are obliged to provide external correction to ill-founded student challenges to disciplinary content or methods and to provide summative assessment of
23. As in May 2007, when three U.S. presidential candidates indicated in a nationally televised debate
that they do not believe in evolution.
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student learning as part of their initiation into the disciplines.24 This is appropriate, for instance, in mathematics, history, and the sciences — disciplines in which
knowledge is directly linked with methods of theoretical and empirical inquiry. In
areas of social policy, the law, and moral philosophy, however, disciplinary methods of inquiry are necessary but not sufficient for reaching the positions a teacher
may be expected to promote. Favored positions in these areas are more likely
to be majority opinions accompanied by reasonable dissenting opinions. In such
inquiries it would be appropriate for teachers to correct and evaluate students’ practice of political, legal, and moral reasoning, but not the outcomes of that reasoning.

Framing Inquiry into Controversial Topics:
The Case of Same-Sex Marriage
A recent issue of Educational Theory includes contending articles by Hand
and Dianne Gereluk on how the topic of same-sex marriage should be taught in
schools.25 The point of their contention is the terms in which the issue should
be framed. Hand defends the “perfectionist” frame, which assumes that the state
may promote what is good for people, and Gereluk defends the “antiperfectionist”
frame, which assumes that it may not, but must limit its concern to civil liberties
and social justice. A discussion of same-sex marriage framed in perfectionist terms
would involve students assessing the moral value of same-sex relationships, while
the same discussion framed in antiperfectionist terms would have them consider
the political rights of same-sex couples.
As Hand explains it, to frame a classroom discussion is to clarify the nature
of the question or problem to be discussed and, thereby, the range of relevant considerations (see FCD). Hand argues that deciding how a topic ought to be framed
is determinative of whether or not it should be taught directively, depending on
whether or not the relevant considerations, so framed, are epistemically settled.
In the case of same-sex marriage, because he concludes that “the weight of the
argument … supports the view that same-sex stable monogamous relationships
have similar [moral] value to opposite-sex stable monogamous relationships”
(FCD, 510), it follows from his epistemic criterion that “classroom discussions
of same-sex marriage [should be seen] as pedagogical devices for helping students
understand why a particular position is the right one” (FCD, 499).
Gereluk uses the same reasoning to justify directive teaching of same-sex
marriage on antiperfectionist grounds. She reasons from the political premise that
“the antiperfectionist framework requires that the state afford equal protections
to homosexual couples” (TDI, 517), to the educational conclusion that “students
should … understand that … same-sex couples must be afforded legal protections
24. Maughn Rollins Gregory, “Constructivism, Standards, and the Classroom Community of Inquiry,”
Educational Theory 52, no. 4 (2002): 397–408.
25. See Hand, “Framing Classroom Discussion of Same-Sex Marriage,” 497–510; and Dianne Gereluk,
“The Democratic Imperative to Address Sexual Equality Rights in Schools,” Educational Theory 63, no.
5 (2013): 511–523. The latter work will be cited in the text as TDI for all subsequent references.
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and have equal access to marriage”(TDI, 512), and further that “students ought
to understand the numerous and various meaningful relationships (including
same-sex relationships) that allow individuals to flourish in their lives. The educative task in this sense is to develop an awareness, acceptance, and recognition of
these various relationships” (TDI, 512).
One reason both Hand and Gereluk raise in favor of directive teaching to
persuade students to accept legal recognition of same-sex marriage is that the
issue is behaviorally controversial — in the UK and Canada, as it is the United
States. Therefore, if Hand and Gereluk are right (as I believe they are) that support
of same-sex marriage is the most reasonable position on the issue (on perfectionist
as well as antiperfectionist grounds), this makes teaching about same-sex marriage analogous to teaching about evolution, climate change, and other topics
that are behaviorally but not rationally controversial. In such cases, Hand is
correct that schools should provide students with guidance in choosing between
reasonable and unreasonable views and between expert and lay opinion. As I have
argued, however, such guidance should be procedurally, rather than substantively,
directive.
Ironically, both Hand’s and Gereluk’s defenses of directive teaching about
same-sex marriage derive from their arguments, respectively, in favor of perfectionism and antiperfectionism as the only legitimate frame for this issue, and
against the other frame. In what follows I will take issue with each of their
arguments against the other’s preferred frame and will defend a third, civil rights
frame that each of them has argued against in order to demonstrate that all three
frames offer open questions for student inquiry and therefore that procedurally
directive teaching is more appropriate than directive teaching on this topic.
Hand’s argument for the perfectionist frame for discussions of same-sex marriage rests on the provocative claim that there is no way to decide the issue by
consulting principles of civil rights or social justice. As for rights, Hand argues that
restricting access to civil marriage does not restrict the liberty of citizens to enter
into intimate same-sex relationships. I will take issue with this argument later
in the essay, but here simply note that it is one that could only be made recently
and only in countries that have decriminalized those relationships.26 As for social
justice, Hand argues, “there is no general principle of justice requiring states to
ensure universal access to public institutions regardless of their purpose” (FCD,
506). This is correct, as Hand illustrates with the example of restricting admission to state-subsidized colleges to the academically qualified. His mistake is to
conclude that the only way to determine which relationships fulfill the purposes
of civil marriage is to inquire into their moral value — a claim requiring more
26. The BBC reports that currently “Millions of people continue to live in places that outlaw same-sex
relationships and prosecute people for being gay. In five countries and in parts of two others, homosexuality is still punishable with the death penalty, while a further seventy imprison citizens because of
their sexual orientation.” See Lucy Rodgers et al., “Where Is It Legal to Be Gay?” BBC News, February
10, 2014; http://www.bbc.com/news/world-25927595.
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justification than his assertion that “the purpose of state involvement in marriage
is to support and promote valuable forms of intimate relationship” (FCD, 502).27
Gereluk argues against the perfectionist frame, first, by claiming that it is
not necessary, since “so long as the particular activity does not do undue harm or
oppression to another individual, it is not the role of the state to decide what is
morally valuable or laudable” (TDI, 517). But this is simply to assert antiperfectionism itself as the justification for the antiperfectionist discussion frame. Gereluk
argues, second, that perfectionist discussion is not appropriate in schools because
“addressing the morally substantive arguments regarding whether [same-sex] relationships are ‘good’ takes educators beyond the acceptable parameters and infringes
on competing private familial belief systems within diverse societies” (TDI, 518).
This argument goes too far, invalidating classroom discussion about any issue of
moral, religious, or political principle on which citizens disagree. Learning about
the plurality of moral views in one’s community, learning to discuss sensitive
topics with careful thinking and mutual respect, and having the opportunity to
self-correct one’s own reasons and perhaps one’s own position are among the most
important educational benefits of inquiry dialogue, but they can be realized only if
we are willing to open central and contestable philosophical issues for discussion
in the classroom.28 Teachers practiced in Socratic pedagogy know very well how
to facilitate such dialogues so that they are respectful and robust. Moreover, one
of the implications of the liberal distinction between the right and the good is
that citizens must never use force (including law) but only persuasion to attempt
to change each other’s beliefs or conduct in cases where these do not themselves
violate political boundaries. But this requires that citizens know how to engage in
noncoercive discourse about commercial, political, religious, or moral issues outside the political sphere. This need, by extension, justifies classroom discussions
of sexual morality in conjunction with, and apart from, questions of law.
Gereluk’s argument for discussing same-sex marriage in antiperfectionist
terms is based on the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada established same-sex
marriage as a matter of federal law in 2005, on the basis of social justice. “The
right to same-sex marriage is not considered a fundamental right in itself,” Gereluk
explains, “but rather hinges on another right, that of equal access to an opportunity
that has been provided to one group of individuals to the exclusion of another”
(TDI , 511). Gereluk reports that in spite of this court ruling, the issues of whether
and how same-sex marriage should be taught in schools remain controversial,
especially since the school systems are not run by the federal government but by
the provinces. She argues that the same political principles that guided Canada’s
27. Later in the essay, Hand sums up this point as follows: “The public institution of marriage represents
special support by the state for certain types of intimate relationships on grounds of their goodness or
value, so any serious assessment of same-sex marriage proposals must inquire into the goodness or value
of same-sex intimate relationships” (FCD, 510).
28. See Maughn Gregory, “On Philosophy, Children and Taboo Topics,” in Philosophy for Children
Practitioner Handbook, ed. Maughn Gregory (Montclair, New Jersey: Institute for the Advancement of
Philosophy for Children, 2008), 53–54.
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legal reform also provide “a robust justification for addressing issues related to
sexual equality [in schools]” (TDI , 512).
For antiperfectionists, the meaning and value of marriage as a public status is
political rather than moral. As couples of mixed religion or ethnicity can attest,
it does not compel the moral approval of others, only their recognition of these
couples’ legal status as equal to their own. Indeed, the value of the public status of
civil marriage is among the most important arguments against the institution of
civil unions or domestic partnerships, which ostensibly provide same-sex couples
many or all of the same legal protections and obligations provided by civil marriage
but explicitly deny them equal public status.29 However, Gereluk’s discussion of
social justice is vulnerable to Hand’s critique that equal does not mean universal
and that most government protections and benefits are appropriately restricted to
individuals with certain characteristics or qualifications. Indeed, Gereluk does not
offer criteria for deciding which human relationships should share equal access
to civil marriage: Same-sex? Polygamist? Incestuous? Adult–child? These criteria
cannot be derived from the principle of social justice itself, as that principle,
which provides that government regulation must be fair, presumes that there
are prior justifications for certain kinds of government regulation in the first
place. Therefore, a social justice frame for discussion of same-sex marriage must
include a consideration of what those justifications might be. This makes it more
complicated than the sexual morality frame since there are a number of different
antiperfectionist justifications for regulating marriage, regarding each of which
it must be decided whether same-sex relationships should be treated equally to
straight relationships. I will offer three of these justifications and show how they
contribute to the inquiry frame.
The simplest antiperfectionist justification for government regulation of marriage is that it brings order to an aspect of social intercourse that would otherwise
be chaotic and troublemaking. Hand writes of marriage as a state-sanctioned institution of privileged membership, and Gereluk writes of it as a government benefit;
another way to think of it, however, is as one of many activities that governments
regulate by licensing and by time, place, and manner regulations — for example,
entering contracts, driving cars, holding protest rallies, and hunting. Governments
regulate these activities not because they are all fundamental civil rights, but
because they pose potential harm, because the opportunity for many people to
29. In practice civil unions do not provide equal legal protection because hospitals, municipalities,
schools, and the like often do not understand civil unions to be the legal equivalent of marriage —
sometimes willfully. But even if this were not the case, the official status that civil unions provide
same-sex couples, being separate, is inherently unequal — a legally established second class of marital
relations. See Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD), “Civil Marriage v. Civil Unions:
What’s the Difference?,” www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/cu-vs-marriage.pdf (accessed October
7, 2014). In 2013 the U.S. Supreme Court made this argument in the landmark case of U.S. v. Windsor,
which overturned the federal Defense of Marriage Act: “DOMA undermines both the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the world, that
their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition. This places same-sex couples in an
unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage” (133 S. Ct. 2675, 22–23).
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do them depends on their being done in an orderly way, or simply because they
are greatly facilitated by legal conventions that clarify rights and obligations and
so establish shared expectations. Most of these reasons apply to marriage. People
will have sexual and romantic relationships, set up households together, combine
property, have children, and so on, with or without government regulation and for
all kinds of reasons, not all praiseworthy. To engage in these activities is to enter
complex webs of obligation and expectation. Laws regarding birth certificates,
adoption procedures, child custody, spousal immunity, inheritance, parental rights
and obligations, medical decision making, ages of consent, joint property ownership, and so forth are like traffic rules that clarify obligations and entitlements,
establish orderly procedures, and thereby both reduce potential harm and facilitate an important kind of activity. These laws are justified irrespective of people’s
motives for forming sexual and family relationships, and of whether the kinds of
relationships they form are part of an overlapping consensus regarding what makes
a worthwhile human life. Nor do they constitute a government’s value judgment
about those relationships, any more than rules about how protest rallies must be
conducted constitute a government’s approval or disapproval of their content.30
The second antiperfectionist justification for government regulation of marriage, which overlaps with the first, is that by means of sexual and family
relationships, citizens impinge on each other’s liberty and equality and otherwise
cause each other harm. Just as unregulated free-market economies have produced
child labor, environmental pollution, and other abuses that are today recognized
as violations of civil liberties and social justice, so unregulated family forms
and sexual relations have resulted in child marriage, forced arranged marriage,
spousal rape, divorce prohibition, the shunning of superfluous male members of
polygamist communities, and other abuses of power that amount to criminal and
political wrongs. Indeed, the government’s interest in “protecting the health and
welfare of children and other persons” from harm by others is one of the reasons
most often given by proponents of legislative bans on same-sex marriage!31 On the
other hand, the fact that laws regulating separation and divorce do not apply to
same-sex couples where there is no provision for their civil marriage means that
individuals with more money and property or with biological ties to their children
are able to take advantage of their former spouses and disregard the best interests
of their children in ways that straight people would not be allowed to do.
A third antiperfectionist justification for government regulation of marriage is
given by John Rawls in a passage that Hand, ironically, cites in support of his own
perfectionist position: that the government should only regulate sexual relations
30. Neither the fact that it might be possible to work out the privileges and obligations of these
relationships without government regulation, nor the fact that some of the benefits governments give to
married couples cannot be justified other than for perfectionist reasons, undermines the reasonableness
of this antiperfectionist, “traffic rules” justification of state-regulated marriage.
31. For instance, this was the first of five reasons given by Hawaii State Director of Health Lawrence H.
Miike in support of the state’s continued bar of same-sex marriage in Baehr v. Miike, no. 91–1394 (Cir.
Ct. of Hawaii, Dec. 3, 1996).
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or a form of family “insofar as that form or those relations in some way affect the
orderly reproduction of society over time.”32 Hand draws the implication from
Rawls “that the state has no basis for any position at all on same-sex marriage”
(FCD, 505). However, I read Rawls as arguing that the state’s interest in promoting
“the orderly reproduction of society over time” gives it exactly the same basis for
taking a position on same-sex marriage that it has for taking a position on straight
marriage, polygamy, adoption, and a host of other issues involving family forms
and sexual relations. By “orderly,” Rawls meant more than in a manner that is
not chaotic and that minimizes harm. As legal scholar Linda McClain suggests,
he also meant that governments should regulate intimate relationships when they
affect the ability of “families [to] serve the important function of rearing children
and preparing them for citizenship.”33 That is why Rawls saw the burden as being
on the side of its opponents to show why same-sex marriage should not be given
the same legal sanctions (and restrictions), for example, if it were “destructive to
the raising and educating of children.”34
An inquiry into whether same-sex, polygamist, or other kinds of family
relationships are entitled to civil marriage on grounds of social justice must
focus on whether those relationships are equally relevant to these kinds of
antiperfectionist purposes for government regulation of marriage vis-à-vis straight
couples. The following are some considerations that would constitute a social
justice frame for that inquiry:
1. Are (same-sex) couples and their children involved in the same webs
of obligation, entitlement, liability, and expectation that, with regard
to straight relationships, justify government regulation for the sake of
defining and clarifying the duties and privileges these relationships entail?
Does society have the same stake in making them follow the same “traffic
rule” regulations of marriage and family that it has in regulating straight
couples and families?35
2. Do the sexual and family relationships of (same-sex) couples make it
possible for them to harm and to impinge on the liberty and equality of one
another, their children, or others in ways that would warrant government
intervention?
32. John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005),
457.
33. Linda McClain, “Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage,” Fordham Law Review 66, no. 4 (1998): 1250.
34. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 457.
35. This question was taken up by the Supreme Court of the state of New Mexico, which
legalized same-sex marriage in December 2013, ruling that “the purpose of New Mexico
marriage laws is to bring stability and order to the legal relationship of committed couples by defining their rights and responsibilities as to one another, their children if they
choose to raise children together, and their property.” See Griego v. Oliver, 316 P. 3d 865
(2013).
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3. Inasmuch as civil marriage is seen as a government-regulated benefit
or opportunity, are same-sex couples capable of enjoying that benefit
or realizing that opportunity? Can they actually “do” couplehood and
parenthood in the ways that straight people do? Are they capable of
“rearing children and preparing them for citizenship”?36
4. Would excluding relationships of (same-sex) couples from the legal
strictures of civil marriage threaten the “orderly reproduction” of a
“well-ordered society” in the Rawlsian sense by inhibiting those couples
from rearing children and preparing them for citizenship?
5. Since governments must provide legal protections and benefits on an
equal basis to all citizens whose situations are similar in relevant ways, is
there any antiperfectionist consideration that would justify the exclusion
of same-sex couples from equal access to civil marriage?
Each of these considerations is complicated, but no more so than those
involved in trying to determine the moral value of same-sex relationships as
required in the perfectionist discussion frame. In fact, these antiperfectionist
considerations are more susceptible to factual evidence than are considerations
of morality.

The Civil Rights Inquiry Frame
A third frame for classroom discussions of same-sex marriage can be derived
from a line of argumentation refuted by both Hand and Gereluk: that civil marriage is a fundamental civil right. In the landmark decision of Loving v. Virginia
(1967), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down state laws against interracial marriage on the basis that they violated both the “equal protection” clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution — guaranteeing the government’s
equal treatment of citizens in similar situations — and the “due process” clause
of that Amendment — guaranteeing that the government will not deprive any
person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Significantly,
in U.S. jurisprudence a distinction is made between “procedural due process,”
which guarantees that governments must use fair legal procedures in regulating
or restricting a person’s liberty, and “substantive due process,” which guarantees
that fundamental rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion will not
be restricted at all, except by laws narrowly tailored to compelling public interests.
In Loving, Chief Justice Earl Warren identified marriage as belonging to the latter
category of fundamental rights that warranted, in this case, the protection of the
federal court against infringement by a state legislature:
36. This question has been central to the political debate over same-sex marriage in the United States.
McClain notes that before Baehr v. Miike, one of the most common bases on which courts denied
marriage to same-sex couples was “an incapacity argument, that gay men and lesbians lacked the capacity
to enter into marriage because a same-sex couple lacked the capacity to procreate (and rear children),
a primary purpose of marriage.” See McClain, “Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and
Same-Sex Marriage,” 1244.
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The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the “basic civil rights of
man,” fundamental to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental freedom on
so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes … is surely to
deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.... Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and
cannot be infringed by the State.37

Numerous state and federal courts across the United States have applied this ruling
to protect the rights of same-sex couples.38 Legal and political scholars disagree
about these decisions, but they demonstrate that reasonable arguments can be
made that marriage is a fundamental liberty, the protection of which constitutes
an antiperfectionist justification for its regulation by government.
Another argument that supports recognition of marriage as a civil right is that
in most democratic societies civil marriage is a legal status over which governments have a monopoly. Same-sex couples can and do form monogamous romantic
relationships, hire attorneys to draw up legal agreements about inheritance, medical decision making, and so on, adopt each other’s children (where permitted),
and have religious wedding ceremonies; but none of this provides these couples
the actual legal status of marriage. Therefore, so long as the government is the
sole provider of that status, their exclusion from it is a violation of their freedom.
In this way, marriage licenses are like driver’s licenses, passports, and protest
rally permits: a government’s monopoly on them means that its refusal to issue
them to certain groups may constitute not only discrimination vis-à-vis others, as
Gereluk argues, but also a serious curtailment of basic freedoms. This is the case,
for instance, in Israel, where there is no civil marriage but only civil registration
of religious marriage. The result is that couples who either do not want a religious
37. Earl Warren, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), retrieved from http://www.law.
cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/388/1. Incidentally, in Hand’s 2013 essay, he takes issue with legal
scholar Linda McClain’s statement that “in our [the U.S.] constitutional system, the right to marry is a
basic liberty,” suggesting that “McClain offers no argument for the claim” (FCD, 504). In fact, McClain
refers to Loving, which indisputably establishes the right to marry as a constitutional right in the United
States. See McClain, “Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage,” 1244
and 1251.
38. In the 1993 case Baehr v. Lewin (645, 852 P.2d 4, May 5, 1993), the Supreme Court of the
state of Hawai’i applied Loving to overturn the state’s marriage law excluding same-sex couples. In
the remanded case the state did not meet its burden of showing any compelling interest that would
justify the law, and the court ordered that same-sex couples be issued marriage licenses — a result
that was obviated by an amendment to the state’s constitution. In 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated anti-sodomy laws enacted in numerous states, ruling that the personal liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment includes intimate consensual sexual conduct among adults, regardless of
their sex (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558). In 2010 a federal district court held that the amendment to the
California State Constitution banning same-sex marriage violated the federal Constitution’s guarantees
of equal protection and due process (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921), and in 2013 another
federal district court made the same ruling against a similar amendment to the Utah State Constitution
(Kitchen v. Herbert [D. Utah 2013], pp. 18 and 31). Since then, state and federal courts have used this
reasoning to overturn same-sex marriage bans in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.
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marriage or cannot find a religious authority willing to marry them (for instance,
because they are of mixed religion or the same sex) are denied access to marriage.39
An inquiry into whether same-sex, polygamist, or other kinds of family
relationships are entitled to civil marriage on grounds of civil rights must focus
on whether this line of legal reasoning is correct: that decisions about sexual and
family relationships are among the kinds of fundamental personal liberty that
liberal governments are meant to protect. The following are some considerations
that would constitute a civil rights frame for that inquiry:
1. Is “the freedom to marry … essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free [people]”?
2. In states with constitutions that protect a certain sphere of fundamental
human or civil rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion,
is the freedom to make personal decisions about marriage consonant with
the political and legal arguments made in favor of those rights?
3. Does a government’s monopoly on the legal status of civil marriage
mean that its refusal to offer this status to certain groups constitutes a
curtailment of basic freedoms?
4. In places like the United States, where the freedom to marry is a civil
right recognized in the Constitution, one that the government may not
deny to any citizen without a compelling public interest, are there any
such interests that justify denying this right to same-sex, polygamist, or
other couples but not to straight couples?

Conclusion
I have supported Hand’s and Gereluk’s recommendations of moral and social
justice frames for classroom discussions of same-sex marriage against each other’s
criticisms and offered civil rights as a third frame. I have also taken issue with
the argumentative strategy that both Hand and Gereluk use in recommending
particular discussion frames: Hand recommends the perfectionist frame because,
for him, civil marriage can only be understood as a perfectionist institution; and
Gereluk recommends the antiperfectionist frame because, for her, antiperfectionism is the only appropriate mode of political discourse in liberal democracies.
The fact that legal, political, and ethics scholars disagree not only about which
frame is more appropriate to the issue of same-sex marriage, but also about which
conclusion should be drawn within it, indicates that such arguments cannot be
dispositive of the pedagogical issue of how to frame classroom discussions on
this topic, as Hand and Gereluk argue. The criteria relevant to that pedagogical issue should be derived from the understanding of inquiry as a normative
39. See “Former Supreme Court President: Israel’s Marriage Laws Violate Basic Human Rights,”
Haaretz, October 29, 2013, retrieved from http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.555148. Couples
— including same-sex couples — who cannot find religious authorities willing to marry them within
Israel may travel to another country, be married there, and have their marriage registered in Israel, but
this hardship only highlights the injustice of the situation.
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dialogue type designed to reach the most reasonable position on an issue: Can
reasonable arguments be made in support of opposing positions on the issue, so
framed, and are the positions susceptible to argument and evidence such that
their relative strengths will become apparent through a process of inquiry? Each
of the three frames I have considered meets these criteria and would therefore
be appropriate for classroom discussion of same-sex marriage. Further, it follows that it would be inappropriate for a teacher to use methods of directive
teaching to persuade students to accept a position on the topic framed in any of
these three ways.
While any of the three frames would be appropriate for inquiry dialogue, it
would be more consistent with procedurally directive teaching to invite students
to consider this meta-level framing dispute for themselves. The juxtaposition of
Gereluk’s and Hand’s essays reminds us that the dispute between perfectionist and
antiperfectionist liberalism is still very much alive and that the issue of same-sex
marriage is at present one site of its most intense eruptions. Current federal
and state court cases across the United States are addressing same-sex couples’
claims to civil rights as well as social justice. Surely students who are emotionally
and intellectually ready to discuss same-sex marriage are ready to engage in a
meta-level discussion of how that discussion should be framed. Such a discussion
would involve an exploration of the perfectionist/antiperfectionist dispute, which
is relevant to many other issues students might also discuss, such as religious
education, sex education, sin taxes, and drug laws. Thinking together about which
kinds of considerations would be relevant within each frame would also be an ideal
way for students to understand what is actually at stake in that dispute.
Procedurally directive teaching allows for the possibility that students will
fail to self-correct their way toward what the teacher understands to be the most
reasonable position. In the case of teaching about same-sex marriage, this includes
the possibility that students will conclude that LGBTQ people do not deserve
the same rights and privileges associated with civil marriage that straight people
enjoy. However, this possibility does not present a compelling reason against the
arguments just made in favor of this approach. First, no pedagogy of persuasion
can guarantee that students will accept official views, particularly in cases of
heated behavioral controversy. Second, the best chance we can offer students to
self-correct unreasonable views and intolerant sentiments is by permitting them
the opportunity to honestly and openly examine them in an academic atmosphere
where questioning, curiosity, and skepticism are the norm, where the teacher’s
commitment to rigorous procedures of inquiry is seen as prior to his or her
commitment to any particular outcome, and where dialogue is practiced as a
collaborative effort to discover the most reasonable position.40 And third, students
40. Hand points to this possibility as a reason against framing classroom discussions of same-sex
marriage as practical accommodation dialogues, noting that the latter do not “promote … the formation
of reasoned opinions,” or help students “learn how to participate effectively in discussions that seek ‘to
establish the truth about some matter’” (FCD, 510).
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who emerge from the process of rigorous, open-ended inquiry with unreconstructed
intolerant views will at least have heard arguments against them and will therefore
understand them to be epistemically and socially problematic — considerations
they will inevitably carry with them into future thinking and discussion of the
issue.

